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Abstract: In the games with population uncertainty introduced in this paper, the number
and identity of the participating players are determined by chance. Games with population
uncertainty are shown to include Poisson games and random-player games. The paper focuses
on those strategy pro¯les that are most likely to yield a Nash equilibrium in the game selected
by chance. Existence of maximum likelihood equilibria is established under mild topological
conditions.




In games with incomplete information as usually studied by game theorists, the characteristics or
types of the participating players are possibly subject to uncertainty, but the number of players is
common knowledge. Recently, however, Myerson [8,9,10,11] and Milchtaich [7] proposed models
for situations | like elections and auctions | in which it may be inappropriate to assume
common knowledge of the player set. In such games with population uncertainty, the set of
actual players and their preferences are determined by chance according to a commonly known
probability measure (a Poisson distribution in Myerson's work, a point process in Milchtaich's
paper) and players have to choose their strategies before the player set is revealed.
The equilibrium concepts introduced by Myerson [11] and Milchtaich [7] for their classes
of games with population uncertainty are variants of the Nash equilibrium concept based on a
suitably de¯ned expected utility function for the players. Alternatively, the present note stresses
those strategy pro¯les that are most likely to yield an equilibrium in the game selected by chance.
Maximum likelihood equilibria were introduced in Borm et al. [2] in a class of Bayesian games.
Gilboa and Schmeidler [5] recently provided an axiomatic foundation for rankings according to
the likelihood function.
The ¾-algebra underlying the chance event that selects the actual game to be played may be
too coarse to make the event in which a speci¯c strategy pro¯le yields an equilibrium measurable.
A common mathematical approach (also used in a decision theoretic framework; cf. [4]) to assign
probabilities to such events is to use the inner measure induced by the probability measure (cf.
[6]). Roughly, the inner measure of an event E is the probability of the largest measurable event
included in E.
Under mild topological restrictions, an existence result for maximum likelihood equilibria is
derived. Since the result establishes the existence of a maximum of the likelihood function, it
di®ers signi¯cantly from standard equilibrium existence results that usually rely on a ¯xed point
argument.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls de¯nitions and results from topology and
measure theory. Section 3 contains the de¯nition of games with population uncertainty. These
games are shown to include the Poisson games of Myerson [11] and the random-player games
of Milchtaich [7]. In Section 4, maximum likelihood equilibria are de¯ned and shown to exist
under mild topological restrictions on a game with population uncertainty.
2 Preliminaries
For easy reference, this section summarizes results and de¯nitions from topology and measure
theory that are used in the rest of the paper. See [1,6] for additional information.
Let X and Y be topological spaces. A function f : X ! Y is sequentially continuous if for
every x 2 X and every sequence (xn)1n=1 in X converging to x, it holds that limn f(xn) = f(x).
Sequential continuity is implied by continuity of functions; the converse is not true [1, Theorem
2
2.25]. A function f : X ! R is sequentially upper semicontinuous if for every x 2 X and
every sequence (xn)1n=1 in X converging to x, it holds that lim supn f(x
n) 6 f(x). Sequential
upper semicontinuity is implied by upper semicontinuity of functions; the converse is not true
[1, Lemma 2.40]. A set A µ X is
² sequentially closed if for every x 2 X and every sequence (xn)1n=1 in A converging to x,
it holds that x 2 A. Every closed set is sequentially closed; the converse is not true [1,
Example 2.10].
² sequentially compact if every sequence in A has a subsequence converging to an element of
A. Every compact set is sequentially compact; the converse is not true [1, Theorem 2.29].
Let (-; §; P ) be a probability space, where - is a nonempty set, § is a ¾-algebra on -, and P
a probability measure on §. The inner measure P¤(E) of a set E µ - is de¯ned as
P¤(E) := sup fP (F ) j F 2 §; F µ Eg:
Roughly speaking, the inner measure of an event E is the probability of the largest measurable
event contained in E. P¤(E) is well-de¯ned, since the set fP (F ) j F 2 §; F µ Eg is nonempty
(; 2 §; ; µ E) and bounded above by one (P is a probability measure). Moreover, P¤(E) =
P (E) if E 2 §. The lower integral of a function f : - ! R is de¯ned as
Z
¤
f(!) P (d!) := sup f
Z
g(!) P (d!) j g Lebesgue integrable; g 6 fg: (1)
Inner measures and lower integrals are related via the following equality:
8E µ - : P¤(E) =
Z
¤
1E(!) P (d!); (2)
where 1E is the indicator function for the set E. Clearly, if f is itself Lebesgue integrable, then
Z
¤
f(!) P (d!) =
Z
f(!) P (d!): (3)
Below, a version of Fatou's Lemma is shown to hold for lower integrals. First, a lemma is needed.
Lemma 2.1 Let f : - ! R be such that
R
¤ f(!) P (d!) < 1. Then there exists a Lebesgue
integrable function h : - ! R such that h 6 f , and
R
¤ f(!) P (d!) =
R
h(!) P (d!).
Proof. By (1) there is a sequence (hn)1n=1 of Lebesgue integrable functions such that
hn 6 f and
R
hn(!) P (d!) ¸ R¤ f(!) P (d!) ¡ 1n for each n 2 N. The Lebesgue integrable
function h := supn h
n clearly satis¯es h 6 f . Consequently,
R
h(!) P (d!) 6
R
¤ f(!) P (d!)
and
R
h(!) P (d!) ¸ R hn(!) P (d!) ¸ R¤ f(!) P (d!) ¡ 1n for all n 2 N, so
R
h(!) P (d!) ¸R
¤ f(!) P (d!). Hence
R
h(!) P (d!) =
R
¤ f(!) P (d!). 2
3
Proposition 2.2 Let (fn)1n=1 be a sequence of functions f
n : - ! R and g : - ! R a Lebesgue











Proof. Lemma 2.1 implies that for each n 2 N there exists a Lebesgue integrable function
hn with hn 6 fn 6 g such that
R
¤ f
n(!) P (d!) =
R
hn(!) P (d!). To this sequence (hn)1n=1, the





fn(!) P (d!) = lim sup
n
Z




hn(!) P (d!): (4)
Since lim supn f















hn(!) P (d!): (5)
Combining (4) and (5) yields the desired result. 2
3 Games with Population Uncertainty
In this section, games with population uncertainty are formally de¯ned. Subsequently, games
with population uncertainty are brie°y compared with the random-player games of Milchtaich
[7] and the Poisson games of Myerson [11].
The set of potential players is a nonempty set N . Each potential player i 2 N has a nonempty
strategy set Ai. The actual player set is determined by chance according to a probability space
(-;§; P ). To each state ! 2 - is associated a strategic game G! = hN!; A!; (ºi;!)i2N!i with a
nonempty set of actual players N! µ N having strategy space A! := £i2N!Ai and each player
i 2 N! having a preference relation ºi;! over A!. The tuple hN; (Ai)i2N ;-;§; P; (G!)!2-i is a
game with population uncertainty.
This de¯nition captures the idea that is also present in the work of Myerson [11] and Milch-
taich [7] on games with population uncertainty: there is uncertainty about the exact state of
nature ! 2 -, and consequently about the game G! = hN!; A! ; (ºi;!)i2N!i that will be played.
Analogous to the related literature, the probability measure P , according to which the state of
nature is determined, is assumed to be common knowledge among the potential players.
Some additional notation: A := £i2NAi denotes the collection of strategy pro¯les of the
potential players. Assume the potential players have ¯xed a strategy pro¯le a = (ai)i2N . For
notational convenience, denote by a! := (ai)i2N! the strategy pro¯le of the players engaged in
the game G! = hN!; A!; (ºi;!)i2N! i that is played if state ! 2 - is realized. The best response
correspondence of G! is denoted by BR! : A! ¶ A!, i.e.,
8a! 2 A! : BR!(a!) := £i2N!fbi 2 Ai j (bi; (a!)¡i) ºi;! (ci; (a!)¡i) for all ci 2 Aig;
4
where (a!)¡i = (aj)j2N!nfig denotes the strategy pro¯le of the players in N! n fig.
Games with population uncertainty as de¯ned above generalize the Poisson games of Myerson
[11] and the random-player games of Milchtaich [7]. Milchtaich [7, p. 5] introduces random-
player games as consisting of:
² a compact metric space X of potential players;
² a simple point process (cf. [3]) on X that determines the actual set of players;
² strategy sets de¯ned by means of a continuous function » from a compact metric space Y
to X. The strategy set of player i 2 X equals »¡1(fig);
² bounded and measurable payo® functions giving a payo® u(s; S) to an actual player who
plays s when the strategies of the other players are S.
Every random-player game is easily seen to be a game hN; (Ai)i2N ;-;§; P; (G!)!2-i with pop-
ulation uncertainty: set N equal to X, Ai equal to »¡1(fig), identify (-;§; P ) with the distri-
bution of the simple point process, and the preferences with the utility functions u. Milchtaich
[7, p.6, Example 3] indicates that the Poisson games of Myerson [11] are random-player games
and consequently games with population uncertainty.
4 Maximum Likelihood Equilibria
The equilibrium concepts introduced by Myerson [11] and Milchtaich [7] for their classes of games
with population uncertainty are variants of the Nash equilibrium concept based on a suitably
de¯ned expected utility function for the players. This section presents an alternative approach
by stressing those strategy pro¯les that are most likely to yield a Nash equilibrium in the game
selected by chance. Maximum likelihood equilibria were introduced in Borm et al. [2] for a
class of Bayesian games and were considered more recently in Voorneveld [12]. In this section
we de¯ne maximum likelihood equilibria for games with population uncertainty and provide an
existence result.
Consider a game hN; (Ai)i2N ; -; §; P; (G!)!2-i with population uncertainty. The players in
N must plan their strategies in ignorance of the stochastic state of nature ! that is realized. A
strategy pro¯le a = (ai)i2N 2 A gives rise to a Nash equilibrium if the realized state of nature
is an element of the set
f! 2 - j a! is a Nash equilibrium of G!g = f! 2 - j a! 2 BR!(a!)g :
How likely is this event? Although this set need not be measurable (i.e., and element of the
¾-algebra §), a common mathematical approach in such cases is to de¯ne its likelihood via its
inner measure
P¤(f! 2 - j a! 2 BR!(a!)g);
5
the probability of the largest measurable set of states of nature in which the strategy pro¯le
a = (ai)i2N gives rise to a Nash equilibrium. See [4] for another paper using inner measures in
a decision theoretic framework. Formally, de¯ne the Nash likelihood function L : A ! [0; 1] for
each a = (ai)i2N 2 A as
L(a) := P¤(f! 2 - j a! 2 BR!(a!)g); (6)




In a recent paper, Gilboa and Schmeidler [5] provided an axiomatic foundation for rankings
according to the likelihood function. The following theorem provides an existence result for
maximum likelihood equilibria.
Theorem 4.1 Consider a game hN; (Ai)i2N ;-;§; P; (G!)!2-i with population uncertainty. If
there are topologies on A and the sets A! for each ! 2 - such that
(®) A is sequentially compact;
(¯) for every ! 2 - the graph gph BR! := f(a; b) 2 A! £ A! j b 2 BR!(a)g is sequentially
closed in A! £ A!;
(°) for every ! 2 - the function from A to A! de¯ned by a 7! a! is sequentially continuous,
then the set of maximum likelihood equilibria is nonempty.
Proof. The set fL(b) j b 2 Ag is nonempty and bounded above by one. Hence its supre-
mum exists. Let (an)1n=1 be a sequence in A such that limn L(a
n) = supb2A L(b). Since A is
sequentially compact by (®), the sequence (an)1n=1 has a subsequence converging to an element
a 2 A. Without loss of generality, this subsequence is taken to be (an)1n=1 itself: limn an = a.
This a 2 A is shown to be a maximum likelihood equilibrium.
For each ! 2 - and b! 2 A! it holds by de¯nition that b! 2 BR!(b!) if and only if
(b!; b!) 2 gph BR!. Hence
8! 2 -;8b! 2 A! : 1f!2-jb!2BR!(b!)g(!) = 1gph BR!(b!; b!): (7)
We show that for every ! 2 -, the function from A! to f0; 1g de¯ned by b! 7! 1gph BR! (b!; b!)
is sequentially upper semicontinuous. Fix ! 2 - and a sequence (bn!)1n=1 in A! converging to
b! 2 A!. To show: lim supn 1gph BR!(bn!; bn!) 6 1gph BR! (b!; b!). Since (1gph BR! (bn!; bn!))1n=1
is a sequence in f0; 1g, the inequality trivially holds if 1gph BR!(b! ; b!) = 1. So assume that








(sup f1gph BR! (bm! ; bm! ) j m ¸ ng) = 0;
6
i.e., that there exists an n 2 N such that 1gph BR! (bm! ; bm! ) = 0 for each m ¸ n. Suppose, to the









! ) = 1 for each k 2 N, i.e., (bn(k)! ; bn(k)! ) 2 gph BR! for each k 2 N.




! ) = (b! ; b!) 2
gph BR!, contradicting the assumption that 1gph BR! (b!; b!) = 0. This settles the preliminary
work. In the sequence of (in)equalities below,
² the ¯rst equality is (6),
² the second equality follows from (2) and (7),
² the ¯rst inequality follows from sequential upper semicontinuity of b! 7! 1gph BR! (b!; b!)
and the fact that an! ! a! , since an ! a and a 7! a! is sequentially continuous by (°),
² the second inequality follows from Fatou's Lemma for lower integrals (Proposition 2.2),
² the third equality follows from (2), (6), and (7),
² the ¯nal equality follows from supb2A L(b) = limn L(an) = limsupn L(an).
The following (in)equalities hold:






























But then a 2 A is a maximum likelihood equilibrium of hN; (Ai)i2N ;-;§; P; (G!)!2-i. 2
A compactness condition like (®) is standard in equilibrium existence results. The sequential
continuity condition (°) guarantees that a convergent sequence of strategy pro¯les in A is pro-
jected to a convergent sequence of strategy pro¯les in the games (G!)!2- that are realized in the
di®erent states of nature. This condition is automatically ful¯lled if for instance the topologies
on A and (A!)!2- are taken to be the product topologies of those on the strategy spaces Ai of
the players i 2 N . The closedness condition (¯) on the graphs of best response correspondences
(BR!)!2- is closely related to the upper semicontinuity conditions imposed on best response
correspondences in equilibrium existence proofs using the Kakutani ¯xed point theorem. As
7
a consequence, even though the existence proof of maximum likelihood equilibria signi¯cantly
di®ers from existence proofs involving a ¯xed point argument, the basic conditions driving the
result are the same.
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